Laserfiche WebLink
AIS & HUGHES, P <br />tiarne s Mabbu, Cali€om; <br />VIA CERTIFIED MAIL <br />August 3, 2018 <br />City Council <br />c/o City Clerk <br />1017 Middlefield Road <br />Redwood City, CA 94063 <br />Re: Violation of California Voting Rights Act <br />28905 Wight Road <br />Malibu, California 90265 <br />(3 10) 457-0970 <br />k€shenkmane.shenkmanlIushes.com <br />G <br />AUG 0 8 2,D18 <br />} <br />i 7 <br />1 write on behalf of our client, Southwest Voter Registration Education Project and its <br />members. Redwood City ("City") relies upon an at -large election system for electing <br />candidates to its City Council. Moreover, voting within Redwood City is racially <br />polarized, resulting in minority vote dilution, and, therefore, the City's at -large elections <br />violate the California Voting Rights Act of 2001 ("CVRA"). <br />The CVRA disfavors the use of so-called "at -large" voting — an election method that <br />permits voters of an entire jurisdiction to elect candidates to each open seat. See <br />generally Sanchez v. City of Modesto (2006) 145 Cal.AppAh 660, 667 ("Sanchez"). For <br />example, if the U.S. Congress were elected through a nationwide at -large election, rather <br />than through typical single -member districts, each voter could cast up to 435 votes and <br />vote for any candidate in the country, not just the candidates in the voter's district, and the <br />435 candidates receiving the most nationwide votes would be elected. At -large elections <br />thus allow a bare majority of voters to control every seat, not just the seats in a particular <br />district or a proportional majority of seats. <br />Voting rights advocates have targeted "at -large" election schemes for decades, because <br />they often result in "vote dilution," or the impairment of minority groups' ability to elect <br />their preferred candidates or influence the outcome of elections, which occurs when the <br />electorate votes in a racially polarized manner. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, <br />46 (1986) ("Gingles"). The U.S. Supreme Court"has long recognized that multi -member <br />districts and at -large voting schemes may, operate to minimize or cancel out the voting <br />strength" of minorities. Id. at 47; see also id. at 48, fit. 14 (at -large elections may also <br />cause elected officials to "ignore [minority] interests without fear of political <br />consequences"), citing Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 623 (1982); White v. Register, 412 <br />