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The aforementioned conditions support the imposition of fire-protection and life- <br />safety requirements greater than those set forth in the 2000 Edition of the Uniform Fire <br />Code. <br /> <br /> Finding 2: The strongest ground shaking probably will derive from earthquake <br />activity along the San Andreas, Hayward, or Calaveras fault. At least one earthquake <br />of magnitude 7 to 8-1/4 can be expected during a one hundred year period. In addition, <br />several earthquakes of magnitude 6 to 7 can be expected in the San Francisco Bay <br />Region. Any of these earthquakes would cause moderate to severe shaking throughout <br />this region. The City is particularly vulnerable to devastation should any such <br />earthquake occur. <br /> <br /> The potential effects of earthquake activity include isolating the City from the <br />surrounding area and restricting or eliminating internal circulation due to the potential <br />for collapse of highway overpasses and underpasses, along with other bridges in the <br />City, or an earth slide, and the potential for vertical movement rendering surface travel <br />unduly burdensome or impossible. <br /> <br /> Earthquakes of the magnitude experienced locally can cause major damage to <br />electrical transmission facilities which, in turn, cause power failures while at the same <br />time starting fires throughout the City. The occurrence of multiple fires will quickly <br />disperse existing fire department resources, thereby reducing and/or delaying their <br />response to any given fire. Additionally, without electrical power, elevators, smoke <br />management systems, lighting systems, alarm systems and other electrical equipment <br />needed for building evacuation and fire control in large buildings would be inoperative, <br />thereby resulting in loss of life and/or major losses in such buildings. <br /> <br /> Additional potential situations inherent in such an occurrence include loss of City <br />water resourCes; Hetch-Hetchy Bay Division Pipelines No. 1 and 2, and Hetch-Hetchy <br />Bay Division Pipelines No. 3 and 4 would be expected to suffer damage2, along with <br />inundated areas caused by the failure of earthen dams such as Lower Emerald Lake <br />(Latitude 37° 28.0' ~N,; Longitude 122° 23.2' W ) and Bear Gulch (Latitude 37° 26.0' N; <br />Longitude 122° 13.6 VV)3; underground water main breaks due to soil movement; <br />cylindrical water storage tank failures due to "elephant's foot" buckling, weakening from <br />corrosion, or sloshing of contents; broken natural gas mains causing structure and other <br />fires; leakage of hazardous materials; the need for rescue from collapsed structures; <br />and the rendering of medical aid to large numbers of people. <br /> <br /> The protection of human life and the preservation of property in the event of such <br />occurrence support the imposition of fire-protection and life-safety requirements greater <br />than those set forth in the 2000 Edition of the Uniform Fire Code. <br /> <br />2 San Francisco Public Utilities Commission: Its Slow Pace for Assessin.q Weaknesses in Its Water <br />Delivery System and for Completinq Capital Proiects Increases the Risk of Service Disruptions and Water <br />Shortaqes, California State Auditor / Bureau of State Audits, Report Number 99124. <br />3 Generalized from maps that dam owners are required to prepare and file with the State Office of <br />Emergency Services and available through the Association of Bay Area Governments (ABAG). <br /> <br />f:Atty/Reso/Reso.1333 4 <br />102802 <br /> <br /> <br />