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10.¢-15 <br /> <br /> and a frame store building for the storage, display and sale of hardware. Among <br /> other arguments, plaintiff contended the ordinance was unreasonable and <br /> arbitrary as only prohibiting certain types of uses while allowing other uses of a <br /> more obnoxious character. There the court stated, <br /> <br /> "As illustrating his contention, he has pointed to the fact that the <br /> ordinance prohibits blacksmith and cooper from exercising their <br /> trades within the residence district, but permits the carpenter, the <br /> cabinet maker, the painter, and the printer; it prohibits hotels, but <br /> not lodging houses; pools rooms, but not bowling alleys; lumber <br /> yards, but not livery stables, and vinegar works, but not a cider <br /> press .... Appellant makes no claim that the various classes of <br /> business which the ordinance has prohibited from being <br /> established, maintained, and carried on within said district are of <br /> such a character that their establishment and operation in a <br /> residential district would not be objectionable and obnoxious to the <br /> inhabitants thereof, and therefore may be lawfully excluded from <br /> such a district by the municipal authorities in the proper exercise of <br /> the police power with which they are invested, but he contends that, <br /> by failing to exclude, and thereby impiiedly consenting to their <br /> existence and operation in such residence district, other <br /> occupations equally, if not more, obnoxious than those excluded, <br /> the ordinance containing such enactments and producing such <br /> results is both unreasonable and discriminatory, and therefore <br /> void." (At pp.668-669.) <br /> <br /> In considering Ordinance No.211 of Redwood City ..., we might say <br /> that, while we may not be able to discern the reason which induced <br /> the board of trustees of said city to pass this kind of ordinance, <br /> rather than one which excluded generally all business from the <br /> residence district, we cannot say that no good reason existed for <br /> the passage of the ordinance in its present form .... The objection <br /> to a lumber yard in a residence district is most obvious. Its <br /> presence in such a neighborhood has been declared by this court <br /> to "be a menace to the property" therein. (Citation omitted.) The <br /> same, however, may be said regarding a livery stable... A <br /> satisfactory reason, we think, might be given for the action of the <br /> trustees in omitting from the prohibited occupations most, if not all, <br /> of those mentioned by appellant, and the omission of which <br /> appellant claims renders the ordinance illegal. But, even if this <br /> could not be done, so long as it is not made clear, and we do not <br /> think it has, that good reason does not exist for the discrimination, it <br /> is the duty of the court to uphold the regulatory provisions of this <br /> ordinance. We are satisfied from the showing made that the <br /> ordinance is not discriminatory or unreasonable, but that it is a valid <br /> <br />PRIVILEGED & CONFIDENTIAL <br />Council. Innovations 5 <br /> <br /> <br />