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The aforementioned conditions support the imposition of fire-protection and life- safety requirements greater than those set forth in the 2000 Edition of the Uniform Fire Code. Finding 2: The strongest ground shaking probably will derive from earthquake activity along the San Andreas, Hayward, or Calaveras fault. At least one earthquake of magnitude 7 to 8-1/4 can be expected during a one hundred year period. In addition, several earthquakes of magnitude 6 to 7 can be expected in the San Francisco Bay Region. Any of these earthquakes would cause moderate to severe shaking throughout this region. The City is particularly vulnerable to devastation should any such earthquake occur. The potential effects of earthquake activity include isolating the City from the surrounding area and restricting or eliminating internal circulation due to the potential for collapse of highway overpasses and underpasses, along with other bridges in the City, or an earth slide, and the potential for vertical movement rendering surface travel unduly burdensome or impossible. Earthquakes of the magnitude experienced locally can cause major damage to electrical transmission facilities which, in turn, cause power failures while at the same time starting fires throughout the City. The occurrence of multiple fires will quickly disperse existing fire department resources, thereby reducing and/or delaying their -. response to any given fire. Additionally, without electrical power, elevators, smoke management systems, lighting systems, alarm systems and other electrical equipment needed for building evacuation and fire control in large buildings would be inoperative, thereby resulting in loss of life and/or major losses in such buildings. Additional potential situations inherent in such an occurrence include loss of City water resources; Hetch-Hetchy Bay Division Pipelines No. 1 and 2, and Hetch-Hetchy Bay Division Pipelines No. 3 and 4 would be expected to suffer damage2, along with inundated areas caused by the failure of earthen dams such as Lower Emerald Lake (Latitude 370 28.0' ~N,; Longitude 1220 23.2' W ) and Bear Gulch (Latitude 37° 26.0' N; Longitude 1220 13.6 W); underground water main breaks due to soil movement; cylindrical water storage tank failures due to "elephant's foot" buckling, weakening from corrosion, or sloshing of contents; broken natural gas mains causing structure, and other fires; leakage of hazardous materials; the need for rescue from collapsed structures; and the rendering of medical aid to large numbers of people. The protection of human life and the preservation of property ir :be event of such occurrence support the imposition of fire-protection and life-safety requirements greater than those set forth in the 2000 Edition of the Uqiform Fire Code. : San Francisco Pu::. ~c Utilities Commission: Its Slow Pa.:e for Assessinq Weaknesses in Its Water Deuvery S,,stem an,-: for Completin,q Capital Proiects Increases the Risk of Service Disruptions and Water Shortaqe: California State Auditor / Bureau of State .Auct~ts. Report Number 99124. ~ Genera :ed from maps that dam owners are required to prepare and file with the State Office of Emergen:' ,~ Services and available through the Association of Bay Area Governments (ABAG). F:Atty/Reso/Reso. 1333 4 102802