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<br />6.2A <br />Page 53 <br /> <br />imported water supply. Pipeline failure could come in the form of a pipe bursting or as a result of <br />a major seismic event. The u.s. Geological Survey has estimated a 62 percent probability of at <br />least one magnitude 6.7 or greater earthquake between 2003 and 2032. The failure of one or <br />more pipelines would result in the loss of potable water supply to both residential and <br />commercial customers, resulting in major water shortages. Such shortages could require water <br />rationing and the importing of water until the repairs are completed. <br /> <br />The Commission rejects this alternative as infeasible because it fails to meet the SFPUC's <br />Project objectives for the reasons discussed below: <br /> <br />The No Project Variant would not be consistent with SFPUC) s mission of serving San Francisco <br />and its Bay Area customers with reliable, high quality, and affordable water. Existing facilities <br />were constructed as early as the 1920s and at the time were not sized t.o meet water supply needs <br />through the year 2018, which is the SFPUC's planning horizon for the WSIP. While planned <br />repairs and improvements could help extend BDPL Nos. 1 and 2, these existing facilities do not <br />and would not reliably or adequately serve current and future populations, based on current per- <br />capita levels of use and the potential for a prolonged drought. For instance, jurisdictions served <br />by the SFPUC, specifically the cities of Foster City and San Mateo, have adopted Statements of <br />Overriding Considerations for their general plans because water supply constraints were <br />considered to be significant and unavoidable impacts in approving new development. <br /> <br />Additionally, the No Project Variant would not provide sufficient redundancy to ensure <br />uninterrupted water delivery ifboth planned and unplanned outages occur simultaneously. Thus, <br />one Project objective is to contribute to meeting the estimated average annual demand of up to <br />300 mgd by 2030 under the conditions of one planned shutdown of a major facility for <br />maintenance concurrent with one unplanned facility outage caused by a natural disaster, <br />emergency, or facility failure or upset. Similar to the No Project Alternative, the No Project <br />Variant would not address the need to ensure continuation of service by providing seismic <br />reliability, flexibility, capacity, and redundancy. These system attributes are needed to address <br />required shutdowns for inspection, repair, rehabilitation, or replacement of pipeline sections, as <br />well as reliable replenishment of local reservoirs. <br />Alternative 3: Northern Alignment Alternative <br /> <br />This alternative would cross San Francisco Bay by utilizing the existing Dumbarton and <br />Ravenswood piers on either side of the Bay. It would not include the Bay Tunnel associated <br />with the proposed Project. The Northern Alignment Alternative would follow the existing right <br />of way ofBDPL Nos. 1 and 2, but would then follow local streets to reach the Dumbarton and <br />Ravenswood Piers. The pipeline would rest on top of the former road surfaces of the piers. The <br />pipeline's middle segment would extend between the piers by placing the pipeline within a <br />trench on the Bay's bottom or by constructing shafts and a tunnel. Tunnel construction between <br />the piers could require constructing large earthen cofferdams at the ends of the piers in San <br />Francisco Bay to create a work area. The construction contractor would use either barges and/or <br />the piers as staging areas. <br /> <br />Because the Northern Alignment Alternative would rely on the continued use of BDPL Nos. 1 <br />and 2 across San Francisco Bay, these facilities would not be decommissioned under this <br />alternative because the new pipeline partially supported by the piers would not have adequate <br />capacity to convey all of the water from BDPL Nos. 1 and 2. The SFPUC determined, through <br />engineering studies completed by G&E Engineering Systems and OPAC Consulting Engineers, <br />that BDPL Nos. 1 and 2, the two oldest pipelines, would require several repairs and seismic <br />upgrades. <br /> <br />In addition, photographic investigations show that the interior pipeline walls in several areas of <br />BDPL No. 1 have suffered advanced pitting, or narrowing of the walls, resulting in structural <br /> <br />43 <br />