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<br />6.2A <br />Page 56 <br /> <br />less-than-significant levels. Impacts on recreational facilities would be similar to those resulting <br />from the Project because establishing required construction staging areas along the right of way <br />would likely result in impacts at some parks where the right of way provides insufficient space <br />for staging. While the number of recreational facilities affected would be similar to the proposed <br />Project, facility replacement as mitigation would prevent the permanent removal of any <br />recreational facilities, 'and similar to the proposed Project would not require long-term closure of <br />recreational facilities. <br /> <br />Because the Southern Alignment Alternative would rely on the continued use ofBDPL Nos. 1 <br />and 2 across San Francisco Bay, these facilities would not be decommissioned under this <br />alternative. The SFPUC determined, through engineering studies completed by PG&E <br />Engin.eering Systems and OP AC Consulting Engineers, that BDPL Nos. 1 and 2, the Bay <br />Division system's two oldest pipelines, would require several repairs and seismic upgrades. In <br />particular, these reports indicated that portions of the pipelines, bridge, and trestles that support <br />the pipeline as it crosses San Francisco Bay at Newark Slough and the Dumbarton Crossing may <br />be damaged following an earthquake. Keeping this segment of BDPL Nos. I and 2 in service <br />would require modifications to its supports. SFPUC would need to improve the bridge by <br />strengthening bolted connections, replacing counters, and adding steel straps and fiber wrapping <br />to concrete columns. Wooden trestles would be improved by removing bolts and filling the holes <br />with material to resist deterioration. <br /> <br />In addition, photographic investigations show that the interior pipeline walls in several areas of <br />BDPL No.1 have suffered advanced pitting, or narrowing of the walls, resulting in structural <br />degradation. Because repairing future leaks would likely require a pipeline shutdown, several <br />short pipeline segments would likely be replaced under this alternative to improve their <br />reliability. Also, ground shaking could damage BDPL Nos. 1 and 2 in the area ofPulgas Tunnel <br />Portal, where parts of the pipeline are aboveground and are supported by metal trusses. Several <br />pipeline connections in this area would need to be modified with expansion joints. Finally, the <br />ongoing inspection and maintenance program for BDPL Nos. 1 and 2 would need to be expanded <br />to include temporary repairs, including painting, rust removal, timber and walkway repairs, and <br />rivet, bolt, and brace replacement. <br /> <br />In summary, because this alternative would not require shafts and a tunnel under San Francisco <br />Bay, it would avoid the noise and vibration impacts associated with hauling the large volumes of <br />excavated material that would be produced during shaft and tunnel construction. This alternative <br />also would avoid the decommissioning impacts on a historic resource by continuing to operate <br />BDPL Nos. 1 and 2 between the Newark and Ravenswood Valve Lots. This alternative could <br />achieve the SFPUC's Project objectives, including meeting estimated 2018 average annual <br />demand and replenishing local reservoirs. While the Southern Alignment Alternative would <br />avoid the environmental impacts associated with constructing the shafts and tunnel, the expanded <br />m.aintenance of the aging BDPL Nos. 1 and 2 would result in potentially significant <br />environmental impacts. <br /> <br />. .... .".Although:thhf alternative :would'irieettheSFPUC's'Project"objectives~.the'Coiriinissiori."rejects ...:..... .... <br />the southern alignment alternative as infeasible because it: would result in increased <br />environmental impacts; require higher construction costs; disrupt more residential and <br />commercial areas in comparison to the proposed Project; require more maintenance because of <br />its greater length; decreases delivery reliability because it has more above-ground pipes~ trestles, <br />and retains BDPL Nos. 1 and 2, which are also more vulnerable to earthquake damage; and <br />results in more above-ground pipes and other facilities, which pose security issues. <br /> <br />VI.. STATEMENT OF OVERRIDING CONSIDERATIONS <br /> <br />46 <br />