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<br />if a single agency or entity system provides access to system information to <br />outside agencies on an inquiry or request basis, as a matter of either policy or <br />practice, the system would qualify as a criminal intelligence system and be <br />subject to the regulation. Comment: A commentor questioned whether the <br />proposed exclusion of "analytical information and work products" from the <br />definition of "Intelligence System" was intended to exclude all dissemination of <br />analytical results from coverage under the regulation. Response: No. The <br />exceptions in the proposed definition of "Intelligence System" of modus operandi <br />files, historical telephone toll files and analytical information and work products <br />are potentially confusing. The exceptions reflect types of data that mayor may <br />not qualify as "Criminal Intelligence Information" depending on particular facts <br />and circumstances. Consequently, these exceptions have been deleted from the <br />definition <br /> <br />- 10- <br /> <br />: One commentor requested clarification of the role of the "Project" in the <br />operation of an intelligence system, Le. is the project required to have physical <br />control (possession) of the information in an intelligence system or will authority <br />over the system (operational control) suffice? : Operational control over an <br />intelligence system's intelligence information is sufficient. The regulation seeks to <br />establish a single locus of authority and responsibility for system information. <br />Once that principle is established, the regulation permits, for example, the <br />establishment of remote (off premises) data bases that meet applicable security <br />requirements. of "Intelligence System" in the final rule. For example, analytical <br />information and work products that are derived from unevaluated or bulk data <br />(i.e. information that has not been tested to determine that it meets intelligence <br />system submission criteria) are not intelligence information if they are returned to <br />the submitting agency. This information and its products cannot be retained, <br />stored, or made available for dissemination in an intelligence system unless and <br />until the information has been evaluated and determined to meet system <br />submission criteria. The proposed definition of "Analytical Information and Work <br />Products" in Section 23.3(b) has also been deleted. To address the above <br />issues, the definition of "Intelligence System" has been modified to define a <br />"Criminal Intelligence System or Intelligence System" to mean "the <br />arrangements, equipment, facilities, and procedures used for the receipt, <br />storage, interagency exchange or dissemination, and analysis of criminal <br />intelligence information." Comment: Several commentors raised questions <br />regarding the concept of "evaluated data" in the definition of "Criminal <br />Intelligence Information", requesting guidance on what criteria to use in <br />evaluating data. Another questioned whether there needed to be an active <br />investigation as the basis for information to fall within the definition and whether <br />information on an individual who or organization which is not the primary subject <br />or target of an investigation or other data source, e.g. a criminal associate or co- <br />conspirator, can qualify as "Criminal Intelligence Information." Response: The <br />definition of "Criminal Intelligence Information" has been revised to reflect that <br />data is evaluated for two purposes related to criminal intelligence system <br />submissions: (1) to determine that it is relevant in identifying a criminal suspect <br /> <br />WEISS West Bay Region Node lv/OU Agreement <br /> <br />Page 35 of 48 <br />